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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought in the Fourth Judicial District
Court by plaintiff-appellant, Taylor National, Inc., hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, against defendant-respondent
Jensen Brothers Construction Company, hereinafter referred
to as defendant, to enforce the provisions of a standard
Utah County Board of Realtors Single Resident Listing Form and
Sales Agency Contract.

The contract provided for a commission

\

to plaintiff pursuant to sale of the property involved and
for attorney's fees in the event of breach.

Jesse R. Harrison

and William Soule, d/b/a Value Realty, and Leon Harward and
Judith A. Harward were joined as Third Party Defendan_ts, Third
Party Plaintiffs and Counterclaimants.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, Taylor
National, Inc., for commission in the amount of $8,400.00
plus 6 percent (6%) interest to the date of judgment, but
such judgment was limited in that plaintiff 1s right to
execute on that judgment was indefinitely stayed, plaintiff
was denied its statutory right

of a lien on defendant's pro-

perty, and the trial court furthermore refused to enforce the
attorney's fee provision of the parties' contract.

The date

of the judgment sought to be reviewed is April 15, 1980.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have this court rule that the trial
judge had no power or a~thority to issue an in<lef inite stay

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of execution, thus denying plaintiff its inherent right to
pursue judgment, that the trial court could not deny plaint i f f its statutory right of a

judgment l.ien on defendant's

property, and that the provision for attorney's fees contained
in the parties' contract should be enforced.

Plaintiff, there-

fore, respectfully requests that such portions of the lower
court's judgment be stricken and that plaintiff ~ allowed imnediate
execution on its judgment, granted a lien on defendant ,.s property and be awarded reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to
its contract.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On approximately the 1st day of December, 1977, defendant, Jensen Brothers Construction Company, a corporation
with its principal place of business in Utah County,

list~d

with plaintiff, Taylor National, Inc., a corporation with
its principal place of business in Utah ·County, certain real
property for sale located at 1939 North 90 West, Orem, -µtah,
in accordance with a listing agreement.

In July 1977, the

parties entered into a standard Utah County Board of Realtors
Single Residence Listing Form and Sales Agency Contract
which specified that plaintiff was to receive a

c9Ifu~ission

on the sale of said property, and provided for the award of
attorney's fees in the event of a breach by either party.

The

portion of that contract providing for attorney's fees stated:
In the case of the employment of an
attorney io enforce any of the terms
of this agreement, I agree to a
reasonable attorney's fee and all
costs of collection.
(R.

80).
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During the time such listing agreement was in

~ffect,

but after substantial work and effort on the part of plaintiff

to sell said property, defendant sold the property to

one Leon Harward, for the price of $140,000.00.

On the

basis of the sale by defendant to Harward, plaintiff became
entitled to commission of six percent (6%) of sale price,

$8,400.00.

to-wit:

(R. 7).

Demand was made upon defendant

to pay said commission and defendant failed and refused to
do so .

(R.

8) .

Plaintiff in its complaint asked for the sum of $8,400.00
plus the legal rate of interest on such sum and reasonable
attorney's fees, by the
8).

t~rms

of the listing agreement.

{R.

Jesse R. Harrison and William J. Soule, d/b/a Value Realty,

and Leon Harward and Judith A. Harward were joined as Third
Party Defendants, Third Party Plaintiffs and Counterclaimants.
Trial was held on December 12, 1979, before the Honorable·
Judge J. Robert Bullock.

At that time plaintiff's counsel,

Jackson Howard, testified as to reasonable attorney's fees •
. (R. 443).

There were no objections to his testimony and,

in fact, both parties stipulated that such amount was
reasonable.

(R. 446).

On January 16, 1980, the trial

court's original findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment were rendered.

Plaintiff's objections to such

findings, conclusions and judgment were filed on January 22,
1980.

The trial court's amended findings of fact, conclu-

sions of law and judgment were rendered on April 15, 1980.

(R. 151).

In its amended judgment, the trial court stated:
-4-
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Plaintiff, Taylor National, Inc., ·is
entitled to a judgmept against defendant Jensen Brothers Construction Company in the sum-of $8,400.00 plus 6%
interest from· and after December 9,
1977, to date of judgment, but limit~d
in equity as follows:

a. Execution thereon shorild
not issue aga~nst Jensen Brothers. Construction Cornp~ny and
the same should not constitgte
a lien on real property owned
by Jensen Brothers Construction
Company.
b~

Plaintiff, Taylor National,
Inc., acting in the name and ~n
behalf of Jensen Brothers Construction Company, should be
entitled to pursue the judgment
of Jensen Brothers Const~uction
Company against third party
defendants Leon Harward, Jesse
R. Harrison and William J. Soule,
d/b/a Value Realty and Continental
Value Realty, for the benefit of
plaintiff Taylor National, said
plaintiff to apply the proceeds
of any such recovery toward its
judgment against defendant Jensen
Brothers Construction Company.
(.R.

2 9 9) •

(Emphasis added.)

The trial court al$o refused

to award plaintiff attorney's fees as provided in the contract between the parties.

{R.

289).

Plaintiff:objects to this judgment in its entirety on
the grounds that the trial court had no authority to so limit
its judgment, and on May 9, 1980, filed its notice of appeal.
(.R. 312) •

-5-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO POWER TO INDEFINITELY STAY
PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY TO EXECUTE ON ITS JUDGMENT AND SUCH
LIMITATION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE STRICKEN.
The law in this State pertaining to the stay of executions
is set forth in Rule 62(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This rule states:
Execution or other proceedings to
· enforce a judgment may issue immediately
upon the entry of the judgment, unless
the court in its discretion and on such
conditions for the security of the adverse property as are proper, otherwise
directs.
An inunediate execution is proper, therefore, unless the
court authorizes a temporary stay of execution.

Nothing in

this rule contemplates an indefinite stay of execution on
the

judgment entered before it and there is no authority in

this State which could sustain the indefinite stay of execution
entered in this case.
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the
prevailing party in an action has a right to execute on its
judgment and that a court may·not refuse to· do so, or grant
an indefinite injunction.

Johnson v. Johnson, 544 P.2d 65

(Utah 1975); Livermore v. Hodgkins, 54 Cal. 637, 638;
Zent v. Zent, 281 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 1938).

The Utah Supreme

·court in Ketchum Col. v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 P.
541 (1916), stated:
In any matter of litigation or dispute
of which the inferior court has jurisdiction and it has regularly proceeded.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-6-

to judgment and has jud~cially determined
and declared the rights of the parties
to the proceeding, then the cou~t may

not. exercise its discretion with re~ard.
whether it viill or will ·not. en.force
a judgrrient thus regularlyenterer;t. When

to

the .Judgment is once entered. ana··under
law is an enforceable judgment, the party
in whose favor it is r~ndered has a
·
clear right to h~v~ the s~me enforced
and· if anyone.tries·to interfere with
that right it is also the clear duty of
the court to enforce the judgment . . • •
The court may not arbitrarily or capriciously or for any reason except a sufficient legal reason refuse to act when
the fact is conceded that the ertforcement or the enjoyment of the fruits of
the judgment as the case may be, is
denied.
. . .
To permit such a course
would be tantamount to permitting a
court to enter a judgment but thereafter
deny its enforcement.
. • • The law gives
plaintiff the right to have· the j"udgrnent.
enforced and impose~ the duty upon the
court to enforce it and no discretion is
vested in the court whether it will enforce the judgment or not.

In People v. District Court, 46 Colo. 386, 104 P. -484 -(1Q09)
the Colorado Supreme Court restated the same general rule:

to

It is a mockery of justice
give one
a judgment and then deny him the means
of enforcement.
Every court has the
inherent power and authority and upon it
rests the duty of enforcing its own
judgments and decrees • . . were it otherwise, judgment and decrees of course
would be empty and meaningless things.
It is the substantive right of a judgment creditor,
therefore, to enforce collection of its judgment against any
and all property of the debtor, and Rule 62(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, ·cannot be construed to authorize an
indefinite stay of execution.

In Jones v. District Court of

City and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 468, 312 P.2d 503
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)~)

(1957)

the Colorado Supreme Court addressed this issue:
No rule of procedure adopted by this
court can be so construed as to curtail, repeal or limit the substantive
rights and liabilities created by acts
of the legislature. This court has no
such power.

Only a temporary stay of execution is proper, therefore.

In Conrad v. Medina, 47 A.2d 562 (Mun. Ct. App. Dist.

Col. 1946) the court stated that a trial judge was correct
in holding that ~e had no power to order an indefinite stay:
Courts have discretionary power to
temporarily stay execution of their
own judgments. The exercise of judicial discretion, how.ever, must not be
founded upon what an individual judge
believes are abstract ideas of justice, but upon recognized legal or
equitable principals. -The principal
grounds for which stays have been
allowed are the pending of a timely
appeal or motion, material facts
occurring subsequent to the judgment
and antecedent facts showing fraud in
the rendition of the judgment or want
of jurisdiction apparent on the
record.
In Eaton v. Cleveland St. L. & K. C. Ry. Co. CC, 41 F.
421, 422 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Mo. 1890) the court stated:
While the power to temporarily stay
execution on its judgment resides in
every court, it must be conceded that
it is a power that ought to be cautiously exercised, in other words, it
ought not to be arbitrarily used, nor
should an execution be withheld because
it is inconvenient for a judgment debtor
to pay his debts.
See also Sam Savin, Inc. v. Burdsal, 61 Ohio App. 539, 22
N.E.2d 914 (1939};
395 A.2d 453

~utler

Assoc. Inc. v. Merrill Trust Co.,

(Me. 1978).
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It is proper by analogy to consider Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62(a) and its interpretation by federal courts~
Win~gar v. Slim Olson,

(1953) .

Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205

The federal rule grants a 10 day automatic stay of

execution, but after the ten day period has expired and
before the filing of a notice of appeal, the district court
is without power to stay an execution of a final decree.

In

United States v. One 1962 Ford Galaxy Sed~n, 41 F.R.·D. 156
l

(.S.D.N.Y. 1966) the government asserted that the solicitor
general had not decided. whether to appeal o:r; not and argued
that the court under its broad equity powers could stay
execution until the government decided what i t would do.
Judge Tenney, however, ruled that the court had no power to
grant a stay longer than the automatic ten day pe.riod·
provided for in the rule.
It is clear, therefore,- that a district court has no

power to grant an indefinite stay of execution, and that it
is an inherent right in the prevailing party to execute on a
judgment.

In the case at bar, however, the trial judge

stated that plaintiff, Taylor National, Inc.,·was entitled
to a judgment against defendant Jensen Brothers Construction
Company for the sum of $8,400.00, plus 6% interest from and
after December 9, 1977, except that i t is inequitable for
plaintiff to execute against Jensen Brothers Construction
Company or o·therwise take liens or encumber Jensen Brothers
Construction Company assets as a result of any judcjment in
favor of plaintiff.

(R. 290) •

-9-

'!'his jud.gment is clearly
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contrary to the established authority in this state and is
devoid of meaning since it constitutes a total inconsistency.
Plaintiff has a legal right to judgment and the trial court
had no authority to invoke some vague equity power in an
attempt to exercise control over the legal right of execution
obtained by the plaintiff.
The court itself was confused as to whether it could
rightfully issue an indefinite stay of execution, as evidenced
by the Honorable' Judge Bullock's statements.

During the

course of oral arguments following plaintiff's objection to
the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, plaintiff's counsel, Jackson Howard addressed the Court:

MR. HOWARD:
• . • if we have a right
to judgment that is a legal right.
Equity does not have any control over
a legal right that is obtained .
you can't deprive us of our rights
under the law without due process.
That is unconstitutional.
THE

COURT:

MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:
(R. 816, 817) •

That may be.
"l 7 • · The court finds

•

•

•

"

"I worry about that one."

(Emphasis added.)

The trial court was confused as to whether plaintiff's
right to execute was to be stayed until further order of the.·
court or indefinitely.

The judge first stated:

THE COURT: But you are restrained and
enjoined from levying execution until
further order of the court. And that
is going to stay.
(R ~

8 25) •

(Emphasis added.)

Thereafter, however, the judge

stated:
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE COURT: What about this., "application ·
for further order of the court as herein
provided"? Why did I.do that: 11 plaintiff,
Taylor National, Inc. should be and is
restrained and enjoined from levying
execution upon its judgment unti~ further order of the court."
. . . What
did I have in mind? I can't remember.

(R. 825).

(Emphasis added.) Thereafter the judge struck from

the record the phrase, "until further order of the court",
making the indef ininte stay of execution even more ambiguous
and vq.gue.
Moreover, the trial judge reiterated that he was unsure
of his power to issue an indefininte stay of execution:
THE COURT:
• • • I int~nded it to be a
judgment with no strings on it whatsoever,
except when I got to paragraph 4; and I
said in paragraph 4 that it would, that
they are restrained and enjoined. And
I do~'t know whether I have got ~ha~
pow~r or not.
But, nevertheless, I did,
restrained and enjoined from levying
execution on the judgment . . . and
that bothers me. Because I_realiy-don't
know if I have the power to give a Judgment and restrain them on execution on
an equitable basis.
(R. 834).

The lower court, therefore, realized that it was without
power to deny plaintiff its right to execute upon its judgment
obtained .against defendant.

Such an indefinite restriction

totally emasculates the judgment which plaintiff obtained
against defendant.

As such, these provisions render the

judgment obtained by plaintiff useless, and are contrary to
established precedent and public policy

o~

this State.

Plaintiff, therefore, respectfully requests that the portion
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the trial court's judgment 4enying it the right to
execute on its judgment be stricken.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WRONGFULLY PREVENTED JUDGf.lENT FROM
OPERATING AS A LIEN ON DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY.

The law pertaining to judgment liens is set forth in
U.C.A. 78-22-1, which unconditionally creates a judgment
lien in favor of, the prevailing party as against the real
property of defendant.

This section states:

From the time the judgment is docketed
it becomes a. lien upon· all· the real
property of the Judgment debtor, not
exempt from execution, in the county
in which the judgment is entered,
owned by him at the time or by him
thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien. A transcript of
judgment rendered in a district court
of this state, in any county thereof,
may be filed and docketed in the
off ice of the clerk of the district
court of any county, and when so
filed and docketed it shall have,
for purposes of lien and enforcement,
the same force and effect as a judgment entered in the district court
in such county. The lien shall continue for eight years unless the
judgment is previously satisfied or
unless the enforcement of the judgment
is stayed on appeal by the execution
of a sufficient undertaking as provided
by law, in which case the lien of the
judgment ceases.
Until the lien expires, therefore, the creditor is
statutorily guaranteed a lien on the unexempt property of
the debtor, existing at the time of the judgment or acquired
thereafter.

The Utah Supreme Court and the majority of
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states with similar statutes have unconditionally ripheld
this legal principle.
P.2d. 273

Gray v. Stevens, 5 Utah2d 3~1, 302

(1956); Belnap v. Blaine, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978);

Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah2d 39, 402 P.2d 696, 698 {1965);
Utah Co-Op Ass'n v. White Dist. and Supply Co., 120 Utah
603, 237 P.2d 262, cause remanded to Utah2d 391, 275 P.2d
687

(1954); Webster v. Roderick, 64 Wash.2d 814, 394 P.2d

689 (1964); Jones v. St. Francis Hospital and· School of
•

Nursing, Inc., 225 Kan. 649, 594 P.2d 162 (1979).
The same courts have held that such judgments liens are

of a purely legal character and courts are not given the
equitable power to expand or alter the judgment lien so as
to make exceptions or qualifications for a particular case.
Davidson v. Root, 11 Ohio 98; Boyle v. Bagg, 10 Utah2d 203,
350 P.2d 622 (1960); Conrad v. Everich, 50 Ohio St. 476, 35

N.E. 58 {1893); Savings and L.

Co~p.

v. Bear, 155 Va. 312,

154 S.E. 587 {1930); Federal Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Walker,
115 Utah 461, 206 P.2d 146 (1949) ;- Ha·rris v. Southwest Bank,
133 Okla. 152, 271 P. 683

(1928). · Even a temporary stay of

execution or an injunction against enforcement does not
necessarily result in the destruction of a lien predicated
upon the judgment.

Cook v. Martin, 75 Ark. 40, 87

s.w.

625

(1905); 46 Anl.Jur.2d 518, Judgments, §325.
It has been clearly established, therefore, both by
case law and statutory authority, that it is not within the
trial court's discretion to blatantly disregard the statu-

torially granted lien on a judgment debtor's property •. In
the case
at bar, however, the trial cou~t ~ran~PA
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·a judgment in the amount of commission due against defend~nt
Jensen Brothers Construction Company (R. 299}, but indefinitely
estopped plaintiff from pursuing such judgment and held that
said Judgment "should not constitute a lien on real property
owned by Jensen Brothers Construction Company.

(R. 299}.

Such a judgment is clearly erroneous since U.C.A. 78-22-1
cannot be abrogated by the action of the lower court.

The

court had no authority to make such a judgment since, by the
operation of this statute, when the court's judgment was
docketed in this action on June 26, 1980, a lien automatically
arose upon all the real property owned by defendant Jensen
Brothers Construction Company.

By the very terms of the

statute the lien arose and there is no authority in this
state which would allow the trial court to abrogate the
existence or effectiveness of such a lieri.

The judgment of

the lower court purports to do so, however, and the nature
of its restriction is to prevent any lien upon the property
of the defendant from arising as an incident to the judgment
rendered.

Such restrictions are clearly contrary to §78-22-1

and established precedent, and the plaintiff, therefore,
respectfully requests that such a decision by the trial
court be stricken and reversed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ·WRONGFULLY REFUSED TO ENFORCE THE
ATTORNEY'S FEE PROVISION INCLUDED IN THE. PARTIES' CONTRACT.
In a law case, such as the case at bar, attorney's fees
are properly awarded when an agreement or contract between
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the parties so provides.

Biesinger v. B~hunin, 584_ P.2d 801

(Utah 1978); Stubbs v. Hemmert., 567 P.2d 168 {Utah 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court in Biesinger v. Behunin, supra,
stated that a lower court erred in not awarding attorney's
fees where there was a provision providing for such in the
contract and where a sworn statement signed by the plaintiff's attorney was admitted into evidence along with direct
testimony which clearly set forth the number of hours spent
on the case and the attorney'·s hourly rate.

Since this

evidence remained uncontested by defendant, the· Court stated
that the judgment should properly have included attorney's
fees.
Reasonable attorney's fees, therefore, should be
allowed when the contract between the parties so provides,
and SUGh provisions should be given a broad rather than
narrow or restrictive

m~aning.

Kaffi!~ert

Bros. Enterprises,

Inc. v. Tanque Verde Plaza Co., 102 Ariz. 301, 428 P.2d 678

(1967); Colvin v. Superior Equ.

C~.,

96 Ariz. 113, 392

P~2d

778 (1964); Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 86 Ariz. 288, 345
P.2d 210 (1959); Leventf1al v. Krinsky., 325 Mass. 336, 90
N.E.2d 545 (1950);

Fenn~r

& Shea Const. Co. v. Wadkins, 32

Colo. App. 364, 511 P.2d 924

(1973); Zambruk v. Perlmutter

3rd Generation Builders, Inc., 32 Colo. App. 276, 510 P.2d
472

(1973) .
The general rule, therefore, is that a provision in a

contract or stipulation for the award of attorney's fees in
the event of breach is valid; it is regarded as a reasonable
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provision for reimbursement or indemnity to the creditor.
For an extensive list of cases supporting this principal see
17 Am.Jur.2d 517 §164.

These cases indicate that before

enforLernent of the provision will be allowed, certain facts
must be established.

The cases are not uniform as to what

precise facts must be shown, but it is deducible from the
decisions that a showing must be made as to one or more of
the following:

(1) that the fee or expenses were actually

paid or a liability to pay them was incurred,

(2) that the

stipulated amount is reasonable, and (3) the value of the
serv·ices rendered by the creditors attorney in connection
with the collection of the debt.

See 41 A.L.R.2d 303 §9.

As long as these general requirements are met, as they have
been in the case at bar, a provision within the body of a
contract to pay an attorney's fee is a valid and binding
obligation, not to be ignored by the court.

The Utah

Supreme Court in McCormick v. Swen, 36 Utah 6, 102 P. 626
(1909), stated:
Prima facie the amount agreed upon should
be assumed as the proper fee to be
allowed and unless it is clearly obvious
to the court or is made to appear that
the amount stipulated for is unjust,
oppressive, or unreasonable in view of
all the circumstances of the case the
stipulated amount should be allowed.
A contract such as the one in the case at bar providing
for

~ttorney's

fees to the prevailing party in event of a

breach, is analogous to U.C.A. §78-37-9 which provides for
·attorney's fees in the event of breach or default in mortgage
-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

foreclosure cases.

In Mason v .. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160

P.2d 730 (1945), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In view of the court'$ conclusion of
law that the plaintiff was entitled
to and did, pursuant to the terms of
the note and mortgage, declare the
entire principal and interest inunediatly due and that she was legally
entitled to thereupon foreclose this
mortgage, the contract for a reasonable attorney's fee in~the event of
foreclosure must be recognized •
it follows a·s a matter of course
that the court must find what is a
reason~ble attorney's fee and include
such amount in its judgment.
Mason, supra at 733.

(Emphasis added).

See also Jensen v.

Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915); Kurtz v. ·ogden
Canyon San. Co., 37 Utah 313, 108 P. 14 (1910).
In the case at bar, the contract between the par.ties
provided:
In the case of the employment of an
attorney to enforce any of the terms
of this agreement, I agree to a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of
collection.
(R.

80).
The trial court granted judgment to plaintiff, Taylor

Nation·a1, Inc., but withheld reasonable attorney's fees.

{R. 289).

During the trial on December 12, 1979, plaintiff's

counsel, Jackson Howard, presented direct testimony as to the
amount of attorney's fees:
MR. HOWARD:
My name is Jackson Howard,
I am a lawyer, I am licensed to practice
in the State of Utah.
I have been
admitted to practice since June of
1950. I have been employed by Taylor
National Real Estate Company to represent them in this matter.
To date I
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have spent 13-1/4 hours in their case
and clerks in my off ice have spent
8-3/4 hours in this case. The Taylors
have been billed for the services. I
have rendered the sum of $918.75, and
for the services by other people in
the office $131.25, they have been
billed costs and expenses on thereof
$146.10; for a total fee and cost total
of $1,050.00, plus $146.10. It is my
judgment that the charges made are
reasonable and that the costs expended
were necessary in order to pursue their
cause of action.
I believe that the
charges made are compatible with charges
made by lawyers of similar experience
under similar circumstances and similar
cases.
It is my estimate that i t will
take at least ten more hours to complete the matters that are pending,
including the time in court this day
and reviewing findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment at some subsequent date.
That would indicate an
additional amount of fee approximately
$750.00.
I am available for crossexamination.
THE COURT:
examine?

MR. NORTON:

Do you care to cross-

I have one question.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. NORTON:
The deposition of .Mr. Paul Taylor is a part of your cost?

Q.

A.

Yes.

THE COURT:
costs?

What is it?

What are the

MR. HOWARD: The costs are $146.10.
The expenditures have been for filing
fees with the county clerk's office,
for service fees, for a variety of
copies of the documents that w~ ~ave
had to make, and for the depositions,
the· costs of Mr. Roundy at $90.80.
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THE COURT:
MR.

$90.80?
$90.80.

HOWARD:

THE COURT:

No further questions.

MR. NORTON:
THE COURT:
MR.

Do you have any?

BRADFORD:

THE COURT:
down.

Anything further?

Okay.

No.

Okay, you may· step

MR. HOWARD: Your honor, I have suggested ,to counsel that I have contacted Mr. Ray Ivie, who said he
would file an affidavit with the court
here before co~cerning attorney's fees,
and I would proffer that if he were
called that the testimony that I have
given concerning fees and that the
fees stated are in fact reasonable,
just and proper within the standards·
applicable to lawyers who practice in
Utah county. If you want me to call
him, I will. But I.think he will just
testify accordingly and I have his
affidavit which I have heretofore filed.
Would you stipulate that if he were
called his testimony would be such?
MR. BRADFORD:
MR. NORTON:

I would so stipulate.
So stipulate.

MR. HOWARD: Thank you, your honor.
Plaintiff rests.
(R.

443 I 444) •

(Emphasis added.)

It is clear and evident that no questions nor objections
were raised as to Mr. Howard's testimony and that both
parties stipulated that such fees were reasonable.
Since attorney's fees were an integral part of the
contract between the parties, the court may not rightly give
judgment in favor of plaintiff and refuse to enforce the
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provision regarding such fees.

The parties all agreed and

stipulated that the proof in respect to the fees was reasonable,
the only question for the court to decide, therefore, was
whether plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees.

Since

the provision regarding such fees existed, it was valid and
binding and the attorney·'s fees, as a matter of right, were
to be awarded to plaintiff.

The court cannot change the

contract and bar plaintiff from enforcing the original
provisions.
contract.

Plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of its
Since the court granted judgment in favor of the

plaintiff and stated that it was entitled _to the commission
which was the subject of the breach, it cannot deprive.
plaintiff of the attorney's fee, a material part of that
contract.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is highly inconsistent
in this matter.

The trial judge purports to allow for the

enforcement of the contract against a breach by the defendant,
Jensen Brothers Construction Company, but at the same time
in the name of "equity" purports to deny execution of that
judgment, takes away plaintiff's statutorily guaranteed
right of a lien on defendant's property, and denies enforcement on the clause respecting attorney's fees.
action, however, ·is not an action in equity.

Plaintiff's
An action to

enforce a contract is an action at law, and the parties must
be bound by the terms and provisions of their contract which
are not against public policy or otherwise unenforceable in
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this state.

The trial court was clearly against the esta-

blished weight of authority in

holdin~

that· plaintiff be

indetinitely enjoihed from executing on their judgment, and
has no power to ignore U.C.A. §78-22-1 regarding judgment
liens, nor does it have the authority to refuse enforcement
of the attorney's fee prov_isions in its contract.

Plaintiff

therefore respectfully requests that these portions of the
trial court's j.udgment be stricken and that plaintiff be
~

allowed to execute on their judgment, be given their guaranteed l.ien against defendant's property, and be awarded a
reasonabLe attorney's fee.
DATED this

LJ+A:z day

of August, 1980.

for:
WARD,
PETERSEN
Attorneys_ for Plaintiff
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